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Palmieri: Compensation through NIL

THE BILLION DOLLAR INDUSTRY THAT HAS NEVER PAID ITS
MONEY-MAKERS: THE NCAA’S ATTEMPT AT COMPENSATION
THROUGH NAMES, IMAGES AND LIKENESS
Christopher Palmieri*
ABSTRACT
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) has
regulated collegiate sports for over one hundred years. The NCAA
has long relied upon the principle of amateurism to prohibit college
athletes from profiting from their name, image and likeness (“NILs”).
However, recently this principle has drawn a lot of attention and has
all but crumbled. States across the nation have passed legislation that
will soon come into effect to bypass the NCAA bylaws and allow
student athletes to profit from their NILs, even the United States
Supreme Court has called the NCAA’s business model into question.
This has left the NCAA with no choice but to pivot and allow athletes
to profit from their NILs for the first time. This Note will explore the
NCAA’s history of exploiting student-athletes for profit, and how
their attitude towards the concept of NILs has changed overtime. This
Note begins by looking at the NCAA’s business model and how they
have turned themselves into a billion-dollar business that does not
pay their money-makers, the athletes. Prior to addressing the various
state legislations and federal proposals, this Note will also recount
prior Supreme Court cases. Ultimately, this Note will propose
standardized federal legislation to govern NIL laws.
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INTRODUCTION

California recently became the first state in the nation to allow
compensation to the workhorses of a billion-dollar industry: college
athletics. The state recently passed a bill that will allow college
athletes to profit from their Names, Image and Likeness (NILs).1
This change has caused the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) to reconsider its stance on NILs. California’s statute allows
athletes to be compensated for their popularity and has inspired
Congress and other states to contemplate and propose similar
legislation.2 The NCAA can no longer ignore the fact that the multibillion-dollar industry it created, and continues to regulate, needs to
compensate its money-makers, the athletes.
While historically the players have remained uncompensated,
athletic programs at universities and colleges have been raking in
money hand over fist through apparel deals, ticket sales, and various
non-monetary benefits. All the while, every Division 13 football and
basketball program has exclusive deals with either Adidas, Nike or
Under Armour.4 These apparel deals are incredibly lucrative
marketing opportunities that allow the respective companies to reach
a massive national audience.

1

Jack Kelly, Newly Passed California Fair Pay to Play Act Will Allow Student
Athletes To Receive Compensation, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2019, 12:36 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2019/10/01/in-a-revolutionary-changenewly-passed-california-fair-pay-to-play-act-will-allow-student-athletes-to-receivecompensation/?sh=2d70c02457d0.
2
Nicole Berkowitz et al., More States Draft Legislation To Address Student Athlete
Compensation As The NCAA Passes The Ball To Congress, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 5,
2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5701fc57-8d88-46bc-956943f5b3ca6a5e.
3
See The Difference in the College Division Levels, NEXT COLL. STUDENT
ATHLETE,
https://www.ncsasports.org/recruiting/how-to-get-recruited/collegedivisions (last visited Mar. 13, 2021) (describing what Division I sports have to
offer: “DI offers a higher level of competition and is home to some of the largest
and most prestigious schools in the country.” Id. Further when describing what
Division I sports are like for the athletes “You will be tired. Internships, spring
break getaways, even part-time jobs are pretty much out of the question. The DI
athlete is truly dedicated to their sport for the next four years.” Id.).
4
SI Wire, How Adidas, Nike and Under Armour Have Divvied Up Major College
Basketball,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(Oct.
2,
2017),
https://www.si.com/college/2017/10/02/adidas-nike-under-armour-contractsschools-conferences.
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Since its inception, the NCAA has proclaimed that its true
interests include educating student-athletes and attempting to separate
collegiate and professional sports.
However, this attempted
separation is nothing more than a half-hearted attempt to keep the
commercial nature of college sports behind closed doors. Apparel
deals, ticket sales, and school reputations have made it so that some
college games have over one billion dollars at play when studentathletes gear up.5 Despite this, the NCAA still prevented all college
athletes from making a single cent from their own popularity without
facing serious repercussions.6 Today, tensions surrounding this topic
are high.7 A current class action lawsuit, in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, alleges that the NCAA
is violating antitrust regulations.8 The plaintiffs argue that it is unjust
for the universities, apparel companies, and many others to profit
from the hard work of these athletes without allowing them to earn
money for themselves.9 Furthermore, states across the nation have
pushed the issue by adopting various legislation that will allow these
athletes to profit on their NILs.10 All of this pressure has resulted in
See Kate Gibson, Nike’s high-profile shoe fail costs $1.1 billion in stock value,
CBS NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nike-stockdrop-zion-williamson-shoe-incident-and-injury-costs-1-1-billion-in-stock-value.
(Of importance, Nike lost over one billion dollars in stock value after a star player
was injured wearing their sneakers).
6
See N.C.A.A. Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.1 (effective Aug. 1, 2020); N.C.A.A.
Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.2 (effective Aug. 1, 2020).
7
See generally Steve Berkowitz, New name, image, likeness lawsuit against NCAA
could put hundreds of millions of dollars at stake, USA TODAY (Jun. 15, 2020,
11:08 A.M.), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/06/15/ncaalawsuit-over-athletes-images-likeness-puts-big-money-stake/3189283001.
The
article speaks about a new filing against the Power Five and NCAA over NIL
control and compensation, it also speaks about the increasing tensions on this issue
due to a recent judgement rendered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which
“unanimously upheld a district court ruling that the NCAA had violated antitrust
law with its limits on various benefits athletes can receive from their schools.” Id.
8
House et al. v. National Collegiate Athletic Association et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June
15, 2020.
9
Id.
10
Dave Eminian, How will the NCAA’s new NIL rules affect the Missouri Valley
Conference. What we know, JOURNAL STAR (July 4, 2021, 5:20 AM),
https://www.pjstar.com/story/sports/college/basketball/bradleyhoops/2021/07/04/ncaa-nil-rules-how-they-affect-missouri-valleyconference/7845665002 (discussing all the states that have adopted NIL
legislation).
5
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the momentous decision by the NCAA to adopt an interim NIL
policy.11 This policy allows for student athletes to monetarily
capitalize from his or her NILs without violating any NCAA bylaw.
12 This Note will argue that there will need to be federal action to
override the NCAA’s interim NIL policy without violating any
NCAA bylaw. Federal legislation is the only way to protect the
sanctity of college athletics, while also preventing the NCAA from
continuously being unjustly enriched.
Section II of this Note will focus on the athletes that the
NCAA regulates and delve into the commercial nature of college
sports. After setting the background, Section III will discuss the
attempts to change NILs through the courts and the proposed
solutions, in addition to the NCAA’s evolving stance on NILs.
Section IV will examine the state statutes that have been proposed
across the country and the impact they can have on college sports.
Section V will address and juxtapose the NCAA’s original proposal
and the interim policy it recently adopted. Finally, section VI will
investigate the existing congressional proposals and offer a solution
to address the uniform standard for regulating NILs.
II.

THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE NCAA AND
COLLEGE ATHLETES
A.

The Athletes

The NCAA regulates over 480,000 athletes at the collegiate
Of those athletes, 18,816 play Division I men’s basketball
and 73,712 play Division I football. 14 This is an important distinction
because it is reported that across all markets, the athletes in those
sports bring in a total of $14 billion in annual revenue.15 Out of all of
level.13

11

Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA adopts interim name, image and likeness policy,
NCAA (June 30, 2021, 4:20 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/ncaa-adopts-interim-name-image-and-likeness-policy.
12
Id.
13
Estimated Probability of Competing In College Athletics, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competingcollege-athletics (Apr. 8, 2020).
14
Id.
15
Tom Huddleston Jr., College Football Stars Could Be Earning As Much As $2.4
Million Per Year, Based On NCAA Revenues: Study, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2020, 3:01
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/02/how-much-college-athletes-could-beearning-study.html.
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those players, only 1.2% of those men’s basketball players, and 1.6%
of those football players make the step to the professional level. 16
Thus, for the overwhelming majority of college athletes, the biggest
stage they will play on is at the intercollegiate level. Consequently,
the typical student-athletes’ popularity peaks during their years in
college, and so does their ability to monetarily capitalize on it.
However, prior to adoption of the interim NIL policy, 17 any attempt
to do so would be a direct violation of NCAA bylaws 12.5.2.118 and
12.5.2.2.19
Section 12.5.2.1 of the NCAA bylaws prohibited an athlete
from being eligible to play in college sports if, at any time, the athlete
was compensated for the use of his NILs in advertising, or for
promoting the sale of any commercial product. 20 An athlete would
also be ineligible to participate in athletics if the NCAA learned that
the athlete received any money from endorsing products through
individual use.21 Whereas section 12.5.2.1 was a limitation on the
athlete’s ability to monetize his NILs,22 section 12.5.2.2 prohibited
another’s use of an athlete’s NILs, but only punished the athlete if it
was violated.23 More specifically, if an athlete’s “name or picture
appears on commercial items or is used to promote a commercial
product sold by an individual or agency without the student-athlete’s
knowledge or permission” that athlete must proactively take steps to
stop it.24 Failure to do so could have resulted in players losing their
eligibility to play in collegiate athletics. 25 This meant that even if the
athletes were not aware their NILs were being used to generate
revenue, the NCAA was still at liberty to revoke their amateur status
and consequently their ability to play collegiate sports.26 These
limitations on college athletes’ ability to monetize their NILs was a

16

Estimated Probability of Competing In College Athletics, supra note 12.
Hosick, supra note 11.
18
N.C.A.A. Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.1 (effective Aug. 1, 2020).
19
N.C.A.A. Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.2 (effective Aug. 1, 2020).
20
N.C.A.A. Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.1 (effective Aug. 1, 2020).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
N.C.A.A. Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.2 (effective Aug. 1, 2020).
24
Id. (emphasis added).
25
Id.
26
Id.
17
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limitation exclusively imposed upon college athletes.27 All other
college students, from college musicians to student journalists to
students not involved in extracurriculars students, had the ability to
profit from their NILs.28
B.

What Are NILs and How Are They Used?

The NCAA defines the term “Names, Image and Likeness” as
“the three elements that make up the legal concept known as ‘right of
publicity.’”29 This involves situations where “permission is required
of a person to use their name, image or likeness. For example, no
permission is required for a newspaper to publish a photo of an
athlete playing in a game because the legal copyright would belong to
the photographer, not the person pictured.”30 More generally, the
term and concept of “names, image and likeness” encapsulate an
athlete’s ability to “sell [his or her]NILs to entities for a host of
activities other than in-game broadcasts: including endorsements,
advertisements, items of clothing, appearing at clinics, appearing in
video games, or commercializing an athlete’s social media site.” 31
Although athletes have been prohibited from using their own
NILs to make a profit, that did not stop universities and the NCAA
from doing just that. 32 They do so in a variety of ways. Similar to
many modern companies today, conferences, schools, and the NCAA
itself use social media as a promotional tool. 33 They also use the
athletes to participate in social media blitzes, a marketing strategy
Peter Colin, What’s in a Name? The Battle Over Name, Image & Likeness Rights
for NCAA Student-Athletes Continues, THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL CURRENT (May
21, 2020), http://www.legalcurrent.com/whats-in-a-name-the-battle-over-nameimage-likeness-rights-for-ncaa-student-athletes-continues.
28
Id.
29
Rachel Stark-Mason, What Name, Image and Likeness Means for College Sports.
and how the NCAA is Turning to Student-Athletes to Navigate a Path Forward,
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/champion/name-image-likeness (The NCAAA took
down the page after adopting their interim NIL policy) (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
30
Id.
31
Jayma Meyer & Andrew Zumbalist, A Win Win: College Athletes get paid for
their Names, Image and Likeness and Colleges Maintain the Primacy of
Academics, 11 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT L. 247, 286 (Spring 2020) (discussing what
NILs encompass).
32
See House et al. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 15,
2020.
33
Id.
27
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designed to promote a product or brand, that garners commercial
benefits for the NCAA and its members.34 Moreover, college
coaches may also reap the financial rewards of their teams’
popularity through the online economy of social media. 35 However,
the commercial benefits do not stop with social media opportunities
and e-commerce.36 In fact, the class action complaint filing of House
et al. v. NCAA explains how elite college athletes are exploited for
the profitable gain of others. 37 While football and basketball bring in
the majority of revenue for the NCAA, the inability to profit from
NILs had a harsher impact on athletes who participated in small
market sports, such as gymnastics.38
Katelyn Ohashi was a gymnast for the UCLA Bruins.39
During her senior year, in 2019, Ms. Ohashi’s top-scoring floor
routine “went viral[,] making her one of the most famous college
gymnasts ever. But NCAA rules prevented Ohashi from making any
money from the performance.”40 Ms. Ohashi was featured in an oped video, published by the New York Times, arguing for college
athletes to be able to monetize their achievements.41 She explained
34

Id.
The cyber economy encapsulates different aspects of using the internet to create
revenue. Such as when:
35

The NCAA, conferences, and schools (…) promote themselves
and their athletic programs via social media such as Instagram
and Twitter, and have their athletes participate in social media
blitzes for the commercial benefit of the NCAA and its members.
Coaches and others associated with college athletic programs also
reap the financial rewards of payments from social media
companies and other lucrative aspects of the online economy.
Yet, the NCAA’s draconian NIL restrictions prevent studentathletes from commercially benefitting from their postings on
social media, despite the fact that other college students are able
to commercially benefit from social media opportunities and
many do.
Id.
36
See generally House et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 15, 2020 (referencing the many
ways that social media is used to generate money for college athletic programs).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 4.
40
Katelyn Ohashi, Everyone Made Money Off My N.C.A.A. Career, Except Me,
N.Y TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/katelynohashi-fair-play-act.html.
41
House et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 15, 2020 at 4.
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how both UCLA, the school she attended, and the NCAA were able
to profit from the 100 million views on her routine, yet she was not
able to earn a single dollar from this social media popularity. 42 Ms.
Ohashi’s NIL value post-graduation, simply due to the sport that she
plays, will quickly diminish as there is not any viable professional
sports option in gymnastics. 43 Those who play similar sports are not
left with lucrative options post-college, and even in sports that do
have a professional level, the chance of reaching it is slim at best. 44
This is just one story of many other athletes whose NILs have been
exploited for the profit of others without any compensation to the
athletes themselves.
C.

The Line Between College and Professional Sports

Under the section titled “Commitment to the Division I
Collegiate Model” of the NCAA Division I manual is a subsection
titled “The Commitment to Amateurism.”45 This subsection outlines
the NCAA’s attempt to separate collegiate and professional sports. 46
It provides that all Division I members of the NCAA must run their
athletics programs in accordance with the NCAA bylaws.47 It further
adds that students “choose to participate in intercollegiate athletics as
a part of their educational experience thus maintaining a line of
demarcation between student athletes who participate in Collegiate
Model and athletes competing in the professional model.”48
The NCAA bolsters the division between professional and
collegiate athletics by requiring all prospective student-athletes in
Division I and II schools to register with the NCAA as amateur
athletes prior to competing. 49 Once registered as amateur athletes,
the athletes become subject to specific stipulations in order to retain
42

Ohashi, supra note 39.
House et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 15, 2020 at 4.
44
Estimated Probability Of Competing In Professional Athletics, NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competingprofessional-athletics, (Apr. 8, 2020).
45
N.C.A.A. Const., Commitment to the Division I Collegiate Model, XIII
(effective Aug. 1, 2020).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/amateurism
(last visited Sept. 26, 2020).
43
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their amateur status.50 If athletes are found to have violated any of
the enumerated stipulations, their amateur status become at risk, and
thus so does their eligibility to participate in college sports at the
Division I and II level.51
Although the athletes must receive a certificate of amateurism
from the NCAA in order to be eligible to play and are subject to
NCAA bylaws, they are not unionized and therefore cannot
collectively bargain like athletes in leagues such as the NFL and
NBA.52 In 2015, the Northwestern football team attempted to
challenge this and become a recognized union with the National
Labor Relations Board. 53 This attempt was shut down, failing to
address the issue of “whether the players, who spend long hours on
football and help generate millions of dollars for Northwestern, are
university employees.”54 The National Labor Relations Board
dismissed the case due to the “potentially wide-ranging impacts on
college sports [that] would not have promoted ‘stability in labor
relations.’”55
After the decision, Northwestern University
spokesperson, Alan Cubbage released a statement that the University
was “pleased that the N.L.R.B. has agreed with the university’s
position.”56 The chief legal officer of the NCAA, Donald Remy,
released a similar statement saying “[t]his union-backed attempt to
turn student-athletes into employees undermines the purpose of
college: an education. Student-athletes are not employees.”57

50

Id.
Id.
52
Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players' Union Bid, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrb-says-northwesternfootball-players-cannot-unionize.html.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. (Northwestern University was opposed to the idea of a unionized team, and
the implications of such a decision.).
57
Donald Remy, NCAA Responds to Union Proposal, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/ncaa-respondsunion-proposal (last visited Mar. 12, 2020).
51

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 15

1614

TOURO LAW REVIEW
D.

Vol. 37

The Commercial Nature of College Athletics

NCAA President Mark Emmert says that college sports are
about education of students and competing. 58 This is the same
NCAA that reported a revenue of $1,118,495,545.00 in August of
2019.59 In August 2019, television deals brought in a whopping
$867,527,070.00, accounting for the majority of the NCAA’s
revenue.60 Despite how astounding those numbers may seem, it is
just a drop in the bucket of the money college athletics produce. The
true money at play in a single college game was perfectly highlighted
on February 20, 2019.61
The highly anticipated and biggest rivalry game in college
basketball just tipped off. 62 The number one team in the nation
during the 2019 season, the Duke Blue Devils, played against the
eighth ranked team, the University of North Carolina (UNC) Tar
Heels.63 Duke, outfitted in their Nike sponsored gear, took the ball
out after UNC scored on their opening possession. 64 The ball was
brought up the court and passed over to the future number one overall
pick in the NBA draft, Zion Williamson. As everyone watching had
their eyes glued to their screens hoping to see one of his patented
high-flying dunks, Zion drove to the rim at full speed. Zion made a
hard cut, causing his Nike sneaker to rupture underneath him. He
subsequently slipped and suffered a knee injury.65 The following
day, Nike stock dropped over one billion dollars.66 This situation
exemplifies the fact that these young athletes can have nearly a
billion dollars riding on their performance and health in every
matchup. Furthermore, if Zion had been more seriously injured and
58

Mark Emmert, Office of the President, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/whowe-are/office-president (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
59
National Collegiate Athletic Association Consolidated Financial Statements,
August
31,
2019
and
2018,
NCAA,
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/finance/201819NCAAFin_NCAAFinancials.pdf.
60
Id.
61
Kate Gibson, Nike’s High-Profile Shoe Fail Costs $1.1 Billion In Stock Value,
CBS NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nike-stockdrop-zion-williamson-shoe-incident-and-injury-costs-1-1-billion-in-stock-value/.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/15

10

Palmieri: Compensation through NIL

2021

COMPENSATION THROUGH NIL

1615

“slipped past the number sixteen overall pick in the 2019 National
Basketball Association (“NBA”) draft,” he would have “been entitled
to collect on an $8 million loss-of-value insurance policy--that Duke
University paid $50 thousand in premiums for.”67
Star-players like Zion have turned the NCAA into a moneymaking machine, which in turn has led to lucrative salaries for the
athletic directors and coaches of Division I schools. The average
salary for an athletic director at a Division I school has surpassed five
hundred thousand dollars a year.68 This is a number that barely
scratches the surface of coach salaries. As reported in 2019, “there
were 176 college football and men’s basketball coaches who received
salaries exceeding $1 million, 71 whose salaries exceeded $3 million,
and 38 whose salaries exceeded $4 million.” 69 Among the highest
paid is Dabo Swinney, the head coach of the Clemson University
football team, with a reported salary of $9.3 million dollars and $1.1
million dollars in bonuses.70 If Clemson decides they want to move
on from Swinney before his contract is up, they will have to pay him
$50 million dollars pursuant to his buyout clause. 71 Swinney is not
the “exception to the rule” either, and “the head football or basketball
coach on a college team within the state makes more in guaranteed
compensation than the state’s governor.” 72 Additionally, it is not just
lucrative salaries that these coaches receive. Generally speaking,
members of the coaching staff get a variety of off the field benefits
from “free use of cars, housing subsidies, country-club memberships,
private jet services, exceptionally generous severance packages and
more.”73 Moreover, they gain the opportunity to subsidize their
salaries by way of apparel and sneaker endorsements to book
67

Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 257, citing Mike Chiari, Report: Zion
Williamson's $8M Insurance Policy Revealed After Injury vs. UNC, BLEACHER
REP. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2821748-report-zionwilliamsons-8m-insurance-policy-revealed-after-injury-vs-unc.
68
House et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 8, 2020. at 1.
69
Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 261.
70
2019
NCAAF
Coaches
Salaries,
USA
TODAY,
https://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
71
Id.
72
Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 262, citing, Reuben FischerBaum, Infographic: Is Your State's Highest-Paid Employee a Coach? (Probably),
DEADSPIN (May 9, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://deadspin.com/infographic-is-your-stateshighest-paid-employee-a-co-489635228.
73
Id. at 261.
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contracts.74 All the while, the athletes themselves have historically
been prohibited from reaping the benefits of their own athletic
abilities.
Although the NCAA likes to claim that the athletes are
amateurs and the main goal of the NCAA is to educate the studentathletes,75 the NCAA has still turned college sports into a billiondollar industry.76 The NCAA brings in nearly one billion dollars
through television deals alone.77 The apparel companies get to
display their products before the eyes of millions of weekly viewers,
which, as previously shown, leads there to be billions of dollars at
play each time superstar athletes suit up.78 The universities
strategically use the popular athletes in their athletic programs to
promote their merchandise, ticket sales and social media influence. 79
In turn, the athletic directors are rewarded with lucrative salaries,80
salaries that still pale in comparison to the salaries of the coaches,81
who also gain off the field benefits.82 All of this demonstrates that
the NCAA’s loud proclamations of education are nothing but a
smoke screen to hide the multi-billion-dollar business that it has
created on the backs of uncompensated athletes.

74

Id. at 261-62.
Remy, supra note 56.
76
Steve Cameron, The NCAA Brings In $1 Billion A Year – Here’s Why It Refuses
To Pay Its College Athletes, INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2019, 10:14 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/ncaa-college-athletes-march-madness-basketballfootball-sports-not-paid-2019-3.
77
NCAA Consolidated Financial Statements, August 31, 2019 and 2018, NCAA,
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/finance/201819NCAAFin_NCAAFinancials.pdf.
78
Kate Gibson, Nike’s High-Profile Shoe Fail Costs $1.1 Billion In Stock Value,
CBS NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nike-stockdrop-zion-williamson-shoe-incident-and-injury-costs-1-1-billion-in-stock-value.
79
House et al. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 8, 2020.
80
Id. at 1.
81
Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 261.
82
Id. at 262.
75
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THE NCAA AND COURTS EVOLVING APPROACH TO NILS
A.

Brief History

One of the earliest reforms of intercollegiate sports was the
adoption of the amateurism rule in 1921.83 This adoption was an
attempt to curb the problem of schools paying athletes to attend their
universities.84 However, the schools found creative ways around the
NCAA’s attempts. 85 In 1948, the NCAA adopted the “Sanity Code”
which did not allow universities to give out scholarships, or financial
aid in any way that was not available to an ordinary student. 86 The
NCAA also created “a Compliance Committee that could terminate
an institution’s NCAA membership.” 87 In 1956, the NCAA changed
its rules to allow schools to give scholarships on athletic ability, yet
were still limited to “full grant-in-aid,”88 and anything over it would
leave athletes at risk of losing their amateur status.89 It was not until
2014 that schools were able to offer scholarships for the full cost of
attendance due to athletic ability. 90 Nevertheless, NCAA bylaws still
restricted an athlete “with few exceptions – from receiving any ‘pay’”
based on his athletic ability, whether from boosters, companies
seeking endorsements, or would-be licensors of the athlete’s name,
image, and likeness.”91 As these rules have evolved, there has been
litigation challenging them. The most successful way litigants have
attacked the NCAA bylaws has been through the Sherman Antitrust
Act.92

O’Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir.
2015).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
The NCAA in its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust
Recidivist? 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 333 (2007).
88
Grant in aid covers only cost of tuition, room and board and required textbooks.
89
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054 (9th Cir. 2015).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 269.
92
683 F.3d 328, 340 (7th Cir. 2012).
83
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The Sherman Antitrust Act and the NCAA Bylaws

The Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted to regulate
commerce,93 prohibiting “[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations.”94 Although the
Sherman Antitrust Act was not originally intended to regulate
organizations such as the NCAA, it has “been the most fertile ground
for chipping away at the NCAA’s amateurism rules.”95 In Agnew v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Seventh Circuit held
that “no knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that big-time
college football programs . . . do not anticipate economic gain from a
successful recruiting program.”96 The court further added that even
though universities that are members of the NCAA are nonprofit in
status, “the transactions those schools make with premier athletes-full scholarships in exchange for athletic services--are not
noncommercial, since schools can make millions of dollars as a result
of these transactions.”97 Thus, both the NCAA and the member
universities are subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act.98
C.

O’Bannon Litigation

In 2009, former UCLA Bruin basketball player Ed O’Bannon
brought suit against the Collegian Licensing Company (CLC) after
recognizing himself as a character in a video game created by EA
Sports.99 O’Bannon challenged the NCAA’s amateurism rules on the
ground that they violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by not permitting
him or other athletes to gain compensation on their NILs.100 In 2013,
class certification was granted for all former and current Division I
athletes in football and basketball, whose NILs were used in video
games licensed by the CLC. 101 The athletes sought payment in
specific areas, all of which were prohibited by the NCAA bylaws at
93

See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1.
Id.
95
Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 269.
96
683 F.3d 328, 340 (7th Cir. 2012).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056 (9th Cir. 2015).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1055-1056.
94
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the time: sports video games, game rebroadcasts, advertisements, and
other archival footage.102
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California recognized that few athletes chose to play in foreign
markets or minor league professional sports, “and athletes are not
allowed to join either the NFL or the NBA directly from high
school.”103 The conclusion drawn by the district court led it to hold
that “there are no professional [or college] football or basketball
leagues capable of supplying a substitute for the bundle of goods and
services that the Football Bowl Subdivision (the “FBS”) and Division
I basketball schools provide.”104 Consequently, the court held that
the NCAA bylaws were subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act even
though they are not directly commercial in nature. 105 Ultimately, the
lower court held that the bylaws were in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.106
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
schools were actively engaging in price-fixing agreements by
obtaining the athletes’ licensing through the CLC without having to
pay the athletes themselves.107 The court, however, agreed with the
NCAA that amateurism and its integration into NCAA regulations
did have pro-competitive aspects, such as giving athletes a robust
choice of schools, as well as maintaining the popularity of
intercollegiate sports.108 Lastly, when addressing the “less restrictive
alternative” proposed, which would allow the schools to place
deferred compensation of up to $5 thousand per year into a trust
based on licensing revenue that the athlete brought in,109 Judge Bybee
wrote:
The difference between offering student-athletes
education-related compensation and offering them
cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not
minor; it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed,
O’Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
103
Id. at 966.
104
Id. at 968.
105
Id. at 1061.
106
Id.
107
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1057 (9th Cir. 2015).
108
Id. at 1072.
109
Id. at 1053.
102
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we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism
and no defined stopping point . . . At that point the
NCAA will have surrendered its amateurism
principles and transitioned from its ‘particular brand
of football’ to minor league status. 110
Judge Bybee’s opinion was not fully shared by the majority. 111 Judge
Thomas wrote separately on the decision to voice his displeasure. 112
Judge Thomas argued that the NCAA’s own expert witness’s
testimony proved that putting the money in trusts would have a very
limited impact on consumer demand for college athletics. 113
Furthermore, he asserted that any negative impact “could be partially
mitigated by placing the compensation in trust funds to be paid out
after graduation.”114
Ultimately, the court was split, with the majority finding that
the deferred compensation option violated the amateurism principles
due to the lack of a tie to academics.115 This decision left neither
party going home happy, which became clear when both sides
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was
ultimately denied.116 As a result, the NCAA's regulations were left
vulnerable to more challenges. 117
1.

Reaction of The NCAA And Major
Conferences Post O’Bannon Decision

The NCAA’s dissatisfaction with the ultimate ruling can be
clearly shown through its petition to the Supreme Court,118 stating
that “[t]he NCAA should not have to undergo a full trial (and years of
litigation) or face treble damages whenever a plaintiff or counsel hits

110

Id. at 1078-79 (quoting Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984)).
111
Id. at 1080 (Thomas, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1078.
116
O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
117
Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 274.
118
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. O'Bannon, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016) (No. 151388).
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on a supposedly better way to administer college athletics.” 119 In
addition to its petition to the Supreme Court, NCAA President Mark
Emmert released an initial statement where he said that while the
NCAA “agree[d] with the court that the injunction ‘allowing students
to be paid cash compensation of up to $5,000 per year was erroneous
. . .’[the NCAA] disagree[s] that it should be mandated by the courts”
because the NCAA allows schools to “provide up to full cost of
attendance” for student athletes.120
The top thirty-one conferences released a joint statement as
121
well.
They collectively stated that they were pleased with the
court’s decision only to the extent that it reversed the district court’s
ruling with regard to the $5 thousand deferred payment option. 122
The conferences underlined their “company motto” by stating “[i]t’s
important to remember that we’re talking about students, not
employees. Our goal is for our students to learn teamwork and
leadership through sports, and then graduate and be successful.” 123
2.

Summary of the Major O’Bannon
Implications

In addition to O’Bannon’s disappointment, the NCAA and the
major conferences were not pleased with the outcome of the case.
This case demonstrated that that the NCAA was vulnerable to
litigation, especially through the Sherman Antitrust Act.124 It is
important to note the tone in the responses to O’Bannon from the
NCAA and the conferences, 125 as it quickly evolved over time. At
this juncture, the NCAA understood that this decision left it

119

Id. at 26-27.
Mark Emmert, Initial NCAA Statement Regarding O’Bannon Decision, NCAA
(Sept. 30, 2015, 10:51 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/initial-ncaa-statement-regarding-o-bannon-decision.
121
The Coalition to Protect and Improve the Student-Athlete Experience Responds
to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in O’Bannon Case, NCAA (Sept. 30,
2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/other-statements-about9th-circuit-court-appeals-decision-o-bannon-case.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061 (9th Cir. 2015).
125
Id.; see also Emmert, supra note 119; see also The Coalition to Protect and
Improve the Student-Athlete Experience responds to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in O’Bannon Case, supra note 120.
120
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vulnerable to future litigation, 126 which made it uneasy.
Consequently, the NCAA and the conferences stood together starkly
against compensating athletes in any manner. 127 Despite the NCAA’s
clear view on the subject, future challenges arose.
D.

Grant-In-Aid Litigation

The fear of the NCAA becoming susceptible to further
litigation quickly became reality when two class action suits raised
challenges to the NCAA’s amateurism rules: Jenkins v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association,128 and Alston v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association.129 Collectively, these claims became known as
In re National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-in-Aid
Cap Antitrust Litigation130(“Grant-in-Aid”), and the case made its
way to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Grant-in-Aid had three
parties certified for the class: (1) students who played in the Football
Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”); (2) male Division I basketball players;
and (3) female Division I basketball players.131
While both O’Bannon and Grant-in-Aid targeted the NCAA’s
amateurism rules, O’Bannon focused specifically on NILs,132
whereas Grant-in-Aid widened the scope. 133 The plaintiffs in this
action argued – perhaps not successfully that schools are “buyers of
athletic services.”134 As the buyers, the schools “exercise [a]
monopoly power to artificially cap compensation at a level that is not
commensurate with student-athletes’ value.”135 Consequently, but
for the restraints in the NCAA bylaws, specifically bylaw 15.01.2,
which prohibits any student-athlete from receiving financial aid other
126

See Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 274.
See Emmert, supra note 119; see also The Coalition to Protect and Improve the
Student-Athlete Experience responds to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
O’Bannon Case, supra note 120.
128
In re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
129
In re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
130
958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir., 2020).
131
Id. at 1243.
132
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056 (9th Cir. 2015).
133
See generally Grant-in-Aid, 958 F.3d at 1248.
134
Id.
135
Id., citing In re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1068 (2019).
127
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than what they are eligible for through intercollegiate athletics and
penalizes violations by stripping the athlete of their amateur
status,136 the plaintiffs argued that schools would offer recruits
coming out of high school a higher compensation package that
correlates more closely to their talents and values.137 Therefore, they
argued, these restraints violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.138
The District Court for the Northern District of California held
that the NCAA’s limitations on benefits that student athletes could
receive were unreasonable restraints on trade, and the court went on
to enjoin those limits.139 However, the court did not go as far as the
plaintiffs wanted and held that the NCAA limits on compensation did
not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.140 The NCAA appealed this
decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.141
1.

Before the Appeal

In the time after the ruling from the Northern District Court of
California and before the appeal to the Ninth Circuit there was a
ground-breaking development. California enacted the Fair Pay to
Play Act.142 Generally, the Fair Pay to Play Act provides that any
California school that is a member of the NCAA is not allowed to
limit an athlete’s ability to receive compensation from his NILs.143 In
the wake of this legislation, NCAA President Mark Emmert stated
that the NCAA would not take “any action that is contrary to the
position advocated by the NCAA or accepted by the Ninth Circuit
with respect to the type of NIL payments that were at issue in the
O’Bannon case[.]”144
136

N.C.A.A. Const. art. XV, § 15.01.2 (effective Aug. 1, 2020).
Grant-in-Aid, 958 F.3d at 1248.
138
See id.
139
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, 375 F.
Supp.3d at 1109.
140
Id.
141
Grant-in-Aid, 958 F.3d at 1241.
142
Infra note 160.
143
See Compensation from use of student’s name, image, or likeness; participation
and scholarship eligibility; professional representation, Cal. Educ. Code § 67456
(West 2020, operative Jan. 1, 2023).
144
See Hearing Before U.S. S. Commerce Subcomm. on Manufacturing, Trade and
Consumer Protection, (Feb. 11, 2020) (statement of Mark Emmert, President,
137
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On Appeal

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the lower court
properly applied the “Rule of Reason.”145 The Rule of Reason has
three steps. As applicable to this litigation those steps were: (1) the
athletes would have to show that the alleged restraint has a significant
anticompetitive impact within the identified relevant market; (2) if
this is met, the NCAA would have to combat the anticompetitive
impact by showing evidence that the restraints in fact have a
procompetitive impact; and (3) finally, if the NCAA meets its burden,
the athletes will then have to produce another proposal to the
restraints that is substantially less restrictive. 146 To meet this third
step, the athlete must prove that the alternative is practically as
effective, while still serving the same procompetitive purpose of the
NCAA.147
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the lower
court on all points. 148 The court held that the district court properly
found that the restriction had anticompetitive behavior due to “elite
student-athletes lack[ing] any viable alternatives to [Division I],
[forcing them] to accept[.]”149 The court further added that it is still
anticompetitive with “whatever compensation is offered to them by
[Division I] schools, regardless of whether any such compensation is
an accurate reflection of the competitive value of their athletic
services.”150 The NCAA met its burden on step two of the Rule of
Reason by justifying that the restrictions preserve the demand in that
it prevents salaries to the equivalent of professional athletes.
However, the Court extended the holding as it pertains to the
education-related benefits. 151 On the third step of analysis, the
athletes’ proposed that there should be uncapped education-related
benefits, which the Ninth Circuit also upheld. 152 The court found that
such a rule change was practically as effective as the current
NCAA), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/A3E515B6-A2A3-4453BB32-DE37F4D72FB5.
145
Grant-in-Aid, 958 F.3d at 1241.
146
Id. at 1257.
147
Id. at 1260.
148
Id at 1241.
149
Id. at 1257.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 1260.
152
Id.
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standards in place, and that it would not deter the fans.153 Ultimately,
the Ninth Circuit held that the education-related restraints were in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and were enjoined, however
the court refused to extend the restraints to include non-education
related compensation.154 Thus, the athletes won the battle, but not the
war, albeit a massive battle.
3.

NCAA Response to the Ruling

Almost immediately following the Ninth Circuit decision, the
NCAA petitioned the Supreme Court to review the determination. 155
The NCAA’s chief legal officer, Donald M. Remy, published a press
release in which he challenged the Ninth Circuit ruling, stating that it
inconsistently applied the antitrust rules comparatively to other
federal courts as well as the Supreme Court. 156 Mr. Remy was highly
concerned with the potential fallout following this decision, and went
on to say that he believed this ruling “blurs the lines between college
and professional sports.”157 Further, he added that the decision
“appoints a single court to micromanage collegiate sports, and
encourages never-ending litigation following every rule change.” 158
As expected, the same fears the NCAA had post-O’Bannon had only
been expounded by another adverse ruling. Ultimately, Alston made
it all the way to the Supreme Court. 159
4.

Supreme Court Ruling

In a landmark unanimous decision, delivered on June 21,
2021, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision by
holding that the NCAA rules that limit education-related benefits are

153

Id.
Id. at 1241.
155
Donald M. Remy, NCAA Statement Regarding Supreme Court Petition For
Alston
Case,
NCAA
(Oct.
15,
2020,
10:32
AM),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-statement-regardingsupreme-court-petition-alston-case.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Alston, 141. S.Ct. 1231 (Dec. 16, 2020)
(granting the writ of certiorari.).
154
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inconsistent with antitrust principles.160 While this case did not
involve the NIL policy of the NCAA, it practically rubs elbows with
it. Justice Gorsuch wrote, “[p]ut simply, this suit involved admitted
horizontal price fixing in a market where the [NCAA] exercise
monopoly control.”161 The NCAA tried to argue that the Ninth
Circuit holding would be exploited by universities, resulting in
college athletes receiving unnecessarily valuable items.162 However,
the Court specified that “[u]nder the current decree, the NCAA is free
to forbid in-kind benefits unrelated to a student’s actual education;
nothing stops it from enforcing a ‘no Lamborghini’ rule.’” 163 While
the Court was careful to make a distinction between what was at issue
in this case and the NIL policy of the NCAA, Justice Kavanaugh did
not hold back in his concurrence. Justice Kavanaugh put it bluntly
when he stated “[t]he NCAA’s business model would be flatly illegal
in almost any other industry in America.” 164 Justice Kavanaugh
added an extra jab when he stated that the NCAA’s argument for
justifying not paying student athletes was “circular” and “highly
questionable.”165 Justice Kavanaugh further added “if that asserted
justification is unavailing, it is not clear how the NCAA can legally
defend its remaining compensation rules.” 166 Justice Kavanaugh
further clarified his stance when he stated that the “bottom line is that
the NCAA and its member colleges are suppressing the pay of
student athletes who collectively generate billions of dollars in
revenue for colleges every year.” 167 As such, the NCAA was put on
notice by the Supreme Court whose justices essentially provided the
NCAA with an ultimatum: either make a change or we will.
5.

Summary of Grant-in-Aid

The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that
the lower court had properly applied the Rule of Reason and affirmed
160

Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Alston, 594 U.S. ___ (2021),
supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-512_gfbh.pdf.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. (Kavanaugh concurrence).
165
Id. (noting that the NCAA argues “that its compensation rules are
procompetitive because those rules help define the product of college sports.”).
166
Id.
167
Id.
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the district court judgment enjoining the NCAA rules regulating
education related compensation. 168 This is one of the biggest wounds
in the NCAA’s regulations regarding the amateur status of college
athletes. This class action and its outcome was exactly what the
NCAA and the thirty-one conferences were worried about in the
wake of the O’Bannon decision.169 Their fears became reality in the
following two forms: (a) the Court took the NCAA’s regulations into
their hands, which is something that the NCAA believes the Court
lacks the proper expertise and qualifications to do; and (b) various
states have struck down NCAA regulations on NILS through
legislation.170
IV.

STATES TAKING THE REGULATIONS INTO THEIR OWN
HANDS
A.

The Fair Pay to Play Act

Shockwaves echoed throughout the sports world when the
California State legislature unanimously passed, 171 and Governor
Gavin Newsom signed the Fair Pay to Play Act (S.B. 206) into
law.172 Nancy Skinner, a California state senator and author of the
bill, said of the bill’s intent: “[s]tudent athletes need to financially
strike while the iron is hot and draw compensation for their
performance in collegiate athletics. It is only fair because it is the
athletes who are the draw in these hugely profitable activities.”173
168

Grant-in-Aid, 958 F.3d at 1241.
O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); see also
Emmert, supra note 119, see also The Coalition to Protect and Improve the
Student-Athlete Experience responds to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
O’Bannon Case, supra note 120.
170
Infra note 172.
171
California Legislature, SB-206 Collegiate Athletics, Student Athlete
Compensation And Representation, CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (2019-2020),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200S
B206.
172
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2019).
173
See Alicia Jessop, Fool Me Once, Shame On You; Fool Me Twice, Shame On
Me: Why Congress Must Grant NCAA Athletes Group Licensing And Organization
Rights in Name, Image and Likeness Legislation, HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT L. (Aug.
31, 2020), https://harvardjsel.com/2020/08/fool-me-once-shame-on-you-fool-metwice-shame-on-me-why-congress-must-grant-ncaa-athletes-group-licensing-andorganization-rights-in-name-image-and-likeness-legislation
(citing
Collegiate
Athletics: Fair Pay to Play Act: Hearing on SB 206 Before the Cal. S. Assembly
169
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The act, just a mere two-pages long, is set to go toe-to-toe with the
institutional goliath that is the NCAA when it goes into effect in
2023.174 Although it will be preempted by the NCAA’s interim NIL
policy, the California state legislature effectively put a time limit on
the old NCAA business model by being the first state to push the
envelope.
1.

What the Act Provides

The Fair Pay to Play Act “requires intercollegiate athletic
programs at 4-year private universities or campuses of the University
of California or the California State University that receive, as an
average, $10 million or more in annual revenue derived from media
rights for intercollegiate athletics to comply with prescribed
requirements relating to student athlete rights.”175 Significantly, S.B.
206 provides that any school that meets these requirements are not
allowed to uphold any standard, requirement, rule or any other
limitation that in turn prevents, in any way, student athletes’ ability to
earn compensation from their NILs. 176 Additionally under the law,
the ability to earn compensation from their NILs has no effect on the
respective student athlete’s scholarship eligibility. 177
It is important to note that the Act does not apply to
prospective athletes, and if student athletes hire a sports agent, they
still must be licensed by and follow the federal Sports Agent
Responsibility and Trust Act. 178 Moreover, the title of the Act may
be slightly misleading. The Fair Pay to Play Act “does not create an
employer-employee relationship: neither of those words even appear
in the bill.”179 Furthermore, “California student-athletes will not be
paid to play, nor is there any text pondering what pay would be
‘fair.’”180

Committee on Arts, Entertainment, Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media (2020)
(comments of Nancy Skinner, California state senator and bill author)).
174
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2019).
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2019).
179
Alexander Lowitt, Full Court Press: Legal Vulnerabilities Of California's Fair
Pay To Play Act, 11 WAKE FOREST J. L. P.S.S. 20, 27-28 (2020).
180
Id. at 28.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/15

24

Palmieri: Compensation through NIL

2021

COMPENSATION THROUGH NIL
B.

1629

The Others Following Suit

Although California was the first to pass such a bill, it has not
been the last. Many states have followed suit, passing their own
respective versions of the Fair Pay to Play Act.181 The following
states have either adopted, or considered a similar bill: Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and Tennessee. 182 The various bills are all vastly similar.
Among the similarities are the inability to limit or prevent a student
athlete from being compensated from their NILs, athletes being
entitled to representation either by a lawyer or sports agent.
Additionally, student athletes have to disclose any NIL contracts with
the institution they attend, to ensure that these agreements do not
conflict with any other deals the institution is a party to.183
Although there are similarities between these bills, there are
also variations among them. A notable difference is “whether they
prohibit or are silent as to providing compensation for prospective
student athletes.”184 This variation is of specific importance in
relation to recruiting athletes. Schools that are located within states
that allow compensation for prospective student athletes will be at an
inherent advantage in comparison to those schools in states where it
is prohibited. In an almost avalanche-like fashion, this will have an
impact on the competitive nature of all college sports across the
nation. The consequences of a potential nationwide standard, or lack
thereof will be further discussed in Section VI.185 The bills also
differ in terms of dates where each state’s respective bill goes into
effect.186 The earliest change to go into effect is Florida’s bill, S.B.
646 which is set to be effective on July 1, 2021.187 Now that the
NCAA has adopted a preliminary interim policy, the clock is ticking
for potential standardized federal legislation.

181

Nicole Berkowitz et. al, More States Draft Legislation To Address Student
Athlete Compensation As The NCAA Passes The Ball To Congress, LEXOLOGY
(Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5701fc57-8d8846bc-9569-43f5b3ca6a5e.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
See infra Section VI.
186
Berkowitz et al., supra note 180.
187
FLA. STAT. § 1006.74 (2020).
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Why This Creates More Issues

States across the nation have presented their own solutions for
how the NCAA bylaws should change. However, as mentioned
above, allowing these statutes to come into effect without a form of
national standardization will have a significant impact on the
competitive nature of college sports, particularly in the area of
recruiting. Recruiting is one of the most essential parts of building a
highly competitive and profitable sports program. For example,
imagine a highly talented athlete is choosing between two schools:
one where a version of the “Fair Pay-for-Play Act” has been enacted
(school one) and one with a law that is more restrictive (school two).
No matter what school two has to offer, the athletes at school two are
at an inherent disadvantage because school one will be able to tell the
athletes that while they receive an education and compete in the
highest level of amateur athletics, they will also be able to earn
money from their popularity in more ways than school two can offer.
This is clearly a strong incentive for students to attend schools
located in states with laws like the “Fair Pay-for-Play Act.” This is a
situation that the NCAA wants to avoid at all costs, as it directly
impacts the completive nature of college sports and further adds to
the need for standardized legislation.
V.

THE NCAA RESPONSE
A.

The Initial Response Pre-Alston

After the Pay-for-Play Act was signed into law, the NCAA
sent a letter to Governor Newsom stating that the bill was both
“harmful” and “unconstitutional.”188 Yet, in a seemingly inconsistent
act with that statement a month after the bill was signed, the NCAA
stated in a press release that its Board of Governors unanimously
agreed to look into opportunities for student athletes to obtain
compensation derived from NILs, so long as it was consistent with
the core principles of the NCAA.189 The NCAA convened a meeting
188

Letter from NCAA Bd. of Governors to Gavin Newsom, Governor, State of Cal.
(Sept. 11, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resoresou/media-center/news/ncaarepsonds-california-senate-bill-206.
189
Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness
Opportunities, NCAA (Oct. 29, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
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of a “D-I Name, Image and Likeness Legislative Solutions Group,”
which authored a 22-page document outlining all the changes to the
bylaws specific to NILs. 190 Among the changes outlined in the
document was allowing athletes to be compensated for hosting
private lessons, operating their own camps and clinics, starring in
commercials, hosting autographing sessions, as well as obtaining
money for emergencies through sources such as GoFundMe and
other crowdfunding methods. 191
In the original proposal, there were still limits. One of the
most significant limitations applying to almost all of the changes is
the inability to use school marks or revealing what school that
student-athlete attends.192 Moreover, schools themselves are given
the ability to prohibit an athlete’s involvement in NIL “activities that
conflict with existing institutional sponsorship arrangements or other
school ‘values.’”193 This prohibition is similarly seen across state
statutes.194 The NCAA proposal also places significant limitations on
athletes entering into deals with a sports agent, only allowing these
relationships under three circumstances: 195 “NIL ventures, assist[ing]
in contract negotiations and help[ing] market an athlete’s NIL
ventures.”196 This is a much stricter limitation than those of the state
proposals.197
The proposed changes were supposed to be voted on and
formally approved in January 2021;198 however, the NCAA halted its
proposal.199 The vote to change the bylaws was tabled two days prior
center/news/board-governors-starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-likenessopportunities.
190
Pat Forde & Ross Dellenger, NCAA’s Name, Image, Likeness Legislation
Proposal Revealed in Documents, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 12, 2020),
https://www.si.com/college/2020/10/13/ncaa-proposal-athlete-compensation-nameimage-likeness.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Berkowitz et al., supra note 180.
195
Forde & Dellenger, supra note 189.
196
Id.
197
Id.; compare FLA. STAT. § 1006.74; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West
2019).
198
Forde & Dellenger, supra note 189.
199
Dennis Dodd & Matt Norlander, NCAA Expected To Table Planned Vote On
Name, Image, Likeness Rights Amid Supreme Court Case, Senate Changes, CBS
SPORTS (Jan. 9, 2021, 4:53 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-
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to when it was scheduled to take place. 200 The NCAA cited a
pending Supreme Court case, 201 other legal challenges, and changes
in the White House and the Senate as the reasons for the indefinite
delay.202 NCAA President Mark Emmert doubled down in a letter to
the assistant attorney general, where he stated that “‘[the NCAA’s]
current amateurism and other rules are indeed fully compliant’ with
federal antitrust rules.”203 He further added that the NCAA
welcomes the invitation extended by the Justice Department to
consult with and understand their views on the subject. 204
B.

Post Alston Policy

In the wake of the game-changing Supreme Court decision in
Alston,205 the NCAA position on NILs changed drastically. After
having previously tabled its vote on the NIL policy, within a matter
of days after the Alston decision came down, the NCAA adopted an
interim NIL policy.206 While Alston did not address whether the antiNIL policy of the NCAA violated antitrust laws, the writing on the
wall was clear, especially in Kavanaugh’s concurrence, that the
football/news/ncaa-expected-to-table-planned-vote-on-name-image-likeness-rightsamid-supreme-court-case-senate-changes.
200
Id.
201
The NCAA was waiting for a decision in Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Alston. The NCAA challenged the decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals which held that the NCAA compensation rules violated federal antitrust
laws. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Shawne Alston, et al., 141 S.Ct. 2141, 2144
(2021). The Ninth Circuit applied the Rule-of-Reason analysis; however, the
NCAA argued that the court was too fact intensive in its approach. Id. The NCAA
further argued that the Ninth Circuit holding would effectively allow a single court
the powers of nationwide supervision over the entirety of intercollegiate athletics,
stating that “antitrust laws do not deputize district judges as one-man regulatory
agencies. Id at 5 (citing American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d
1230, 1249 (3rd Cir. 1975)). Adding that antitrust suits are not the manner to
“second guess business judgments” (emphasis added). Id. (citing Chicago
Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996)).
202
Id.
203
Alan Blinder, N.C.A.A. President Seeks Delay on Vote to Let Students Profit
From
Fame,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
11,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaa-delays-voteathlete-endorsements.html.
204
Id.
205
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Alston, 594 U.S., at 36 (2021),
supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-512_gfbh.pdf.
206
Hosick, supra note 11.
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NCAA business model would not stand for much longer. 207 The
NCAA’s interim policy is a mere outline of what will be needed to
address this issue. Yet, this policy is a historic step for the rights of
college athletes, and a reversal of the previous stance of the
NCAA.208
1.

What the Interim Policy Provides

The policy as shown on the NCAA website spans a total of four
bullet points.209 It provides that
Individuals can engage in NIL activities that are
consistent with the law of the state where the school is
located. Colleges and universities may be a resource
for state law questions. College athletes who attend a
school in a state without an NIL law can engage in this
type of activity without violating NCAA rules related
to name, image and likeness. Individuals can use a
professional services provider for NIL activities.
Student-athletes should report NIL activities
consistent with state law or school and conference
requirements to their school.210
The flood gates are now open. With states taking a different stance
on how they choose to address NILs, the current policy impacts
respective schools and consequently the athletes at those schools
differently.211 Understanding this issue, NCAA President Mark
Emmert stated that due to “the variety of state laws adopted across
the country, we will continue to work with Congress to develop a
solution that will provide clarity on a national level.”212 The need for
a standardized solution is more prominent now than ever.

207

See supra notes 159-66.
See Binder, supra note 202.
209
Hosick, supra note 11.
210
Hosick, supra note 11.
211
See supra notes 183-86.
212
Hosick, supra note 11.
208
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What The Results Have Been

Universities across the nation are preparing for the change
and hoping to put the athletes who attend their school in the best
situations possible, for now and the future. This is the biggest stage
that nearly all of these athletes will ever play on; 213 therefore, their
four years as college athletes give them the largest opportunity to
capitalize on their popularity. Among the first of surely many other
universities, the University of Nebraska and the University of
Colorado (“CU”), have announced programs “designed to help
student-athletes build their personal brand if the NCAA’s NIL
restraints are lifted.”214 The athletic director at CU “expressed his
support for the new program, noting that, ‘building a personal brand,
and developing the skills to be a successful entrepreneur will help our
student-athletes capitalize and build on their time at CU and
beyond.’”215
Additionally, college athletes from all sports, all over the
nation have been capitalizing on the new policy change and have
wasted no time to do so. Antwan Owens, a Jackson State football
player, had a “midnight signing” with the company 3 Kings
Grooming, making him the first athlete to sign an NIL deal. 216 To
date, the athlete making the most out of this new policy seems to be
Bryce Young, the man set to be the starting quarterback for the
Alabama Crimson Tide this upcoming season.217 Although he barely
saw the field his first season with the Crimson Tide, Alabama head
coach Nick Saban told the media that Young’s deals have totaled
almost one million dollars. 218 These deals have not only reached
football players; Olivia Dunne, an 18 year old gymnast for LSU may
213

Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, supra note 12.
House et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 15, 2020 at 6.
215
Id. (quoting David Plati, CU Announces “Buffs With A Brand” Program,
CUBUFFS (June 1, 2020), https://cubuffs.com/news/2020/6/1/general-cuannounces-buffs-with-a-brand-program.aspx.
216
Elizabeth Karpen, Players Getting Paid: Here’s Who Signed NIL Deals on
Policy’s
First
Day
(July
1,
2021,
4:29
PM),
N.Y. POST,
https://nypost.com/2021/07/01/here-are-players-who-signed-nil-deals-on-policysfirst-day.
217
Des Bieler, Nick Saban Reveals Alabama QB Bryce Young is Already Making
‘Ungodly’ Profits off NIL Rights (July 20, 2021, 7:52 PM), WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/07/20/nick-saban-bryce-youngungodly-nil-profits.
218
Id.
214
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be the poster child for NIL deals.219 She is currently the only
collegiate athlete to have over 1 million followers on both social
media platforms TikTok and Instagram, with 4 million and 1.1
million followers on both respectively. 220 Olivia recently met with
the “international talent agency giant Creative Artist Agency at 2000
Avenue of the Stars in Los Angeles, which has represented Madonna
and Cher.”221 Entertainment lawyers in the Baton Rouge area, where
LSU is located, speculate that a deal with CAA or a similar company
could bring her anything between four to five million dollars.222
While some athletes have gone as far as starting their own companies
to help their fellow athletes book events, 223 others have not found
their schools as open to NIL opportunities. 224 Of note, Brigham
Young University has informed their athletes that any and all deals
they enter must conform to the schools’ honor code. 225 It is
important to note that at the time of writing, the NCAA’s interim NIL
policy has only been in place for twenty-three days.
VI.

WILL THERE BE FEDERAL RESOLVE?

To date there have been four congressional proposals made
regarding college athletes’ rights to NIL compensation. 226 Each of

219

Glenn Guibeau, Olivia Dunne, LSU Gymnast and Social Media Queen, Could
be NIL Multi-Millionaire (July 8, 2021, 1:57 PM), USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2021/07/08/lsu-gymnast-oliviadunne-tik-tok-social-media-nil-gold/7903126002.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Tommy Beer, These NCAA Athletes Have Already Inked Endorsement Deals
(July
1,
2021,
4:56
PM),
FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2021/07/01/these-ncaa-athletes-havealready-inked-endorsement-deals/?sh=150cbdb44676 (stating that University of
Miami quarterback D’Eriq King “partnered with Florida State quarterback
McKenzie Milton to co-found Dreamfield, a company that will assist studentathletes in booking live events, such as autograph signings and speaking
engagements.”).
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Senators Booker (D-NJ) and Blumenthal (D-Conn) proposed the “College
Athlete Bill of Rights”, Senator Wicker (R-Miss) introduced the Collegiate Athlete
and Compensation Rights Act introduced, Senator Rubio (R-Fla) introduced
the Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act presented by, and Representatives
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the four proposals differ, and some of them are very far apart.
Nevertheless, with the variation seen among state legislation, as well
as the different stances taken by some universities, one thing is clear:
there is a need for standardized legislation.
A.

The College Athlete Economic Freedom Act

The most recent proposal from Connecticut Senator Chris
Murphy and Massachusetts Congresswoman Lori Trahan is a bill
dubbed the “College Athlete Economic Freedom Act.”227 They
propose that there should be “unrestricted access to earning NIL
income in individual and group NIL agreements.” 228 The proposed
Act provides that no college or university can collude with a third
party to limit an athlete’s ability to contract and be compensated for
his or her NILs.229 Moreover, the Act would not allow the NCAA to
prohibit an athlete from retaining representation, whether that be an
attorney, a financial advisor, or an agent, 230 a provision that various
state bills and laws do not include. 231 This proposal also circumvents
the unionization issues previously discussed, by legislating that the
athletes would be granted the right to “organize through collective
representation, like a trade association or 501(c) nonprofit.” 232 This
right would effectively allow the athletes to make group NIL
agreements, such as video game agreements.233 Furthermore, the bill
states that any violation of section 3 of the act shall be treated as a

Gonzalez (R-Ohio) and Cleaver (D-Mo) introduced the bi-partisan Student Athlete
Level Playing Field Act, see id.
227
Id.
228
Andrew Zimbalist, The College Athlete Economic Freedom Act Proposed In
Congress Is A Step Forward On NIL Rights, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2021, 1:20 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewzimbalist/2021/02/07/the-college-athleteeconomic-freedom-act-proposed-by-senator-chris-murphy-d-ct-andcongresswoman-lori-trahan-d-ma-is-a-step-forward/?sh=77e0688f2bbd.
229
College Athlete Economic Freedom Act, S. 1, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2021).
230
See id. at § (3)(b)(1)(a); id at § (3)(b)(1)(b); id at § (3)(b)(2).
231
Berkowitz, et al., supra note 180.
232
Id.
233
Gregg E. Clifton, Senator Murphy Introduces Additional Federal Name, Image
and
Likeness
Legislation,
NAT.
L.
REV.
(Feb.
6,
2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/senator-murphy-introduces-additionalfederal-name-image-and-likeness-legislation.
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violation of 15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B).234 Lastly, any aggrieved private
party may bring suit in the proper federal jurisdiction and any
“violation of [the] Act shall be deemed to be a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.”235 Despite the many rights that this proposal would
afford college athletes, this is still not the most drastic proposal.
B.

The College Athlete Bill of Rights

New Jersey Senator Cory Booker’s proposal is titled the
“College Athlete Bill of Rights,” and out of all proposals it is the
most expansive with respect to the rights awarded to the athletes. 236
Senator Booker, a former college athlete who played tight-end for
Stanford football, took this issue to heart and offers first-hand
experience with regard to the issues that these athletes face. 237
Regarding NIL rights, the proposal only allows colleges and
institutions to restrict an athlete’s ability to market his or her NILs “if
234

College Athlete Economic Freedom Act, S. 1, 117th Cong. § 5(a)(1) (2021). 15
U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B) is a “violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or
practices deprescribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.” Id. Federal Trade Commission Act18(a)(1)(B) is codified as 15 U.S.C.
57(a)(1)(B). Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B) (2011) which provides that the
Federal Trade Commission may prescribe:
rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce
(within the meaning of section 45(a)(1) of this title), except that
the Commission shall not develop or promulgate any trade rule or
regulation with regard to the regulation of the development and
utilization of the standards and certification activities pursuant to
this section. Rules under this subparagraph may include
requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing such acts
or practices.
Id.
235

College Athlete Economic Freedom Act, S. 1, 117th Cong. § 5(c) (2021).
Doriyon C. Glass & Gregg E. Clifton, The Proposed “College Athletes Bill of
Rights” Joins Growing Number of Federal Bills on Student-Athlete Rights,
JACKSONLEWIS
(Dec.
20,
2020),
https://www.collegeandprosportslaw.com/uncategorized/the-proposed-collegeathletes-bill-of-rights-joins-growing-number-of-federal-bills-on-student-athleterights.
237
Ross Dellenger, Inside the Landmark College Athletes Bill of Rights Being
Introduced in Congress, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://www.si.com/college/2020/12/17/athlete-bill-of-rights-congress-ncaafootball.
236
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the State also prohibits institutions of higher education located in the
State from entering into agreements with such entities.” 238 The
athletes would also be prohibited from entering endorsement
contracts with a list of entities provided by the institution they play
for.239 While the act provides fewer freedoms in terms of NILs than
the College Athlete Economic Freedom Act, this provision would
require “schools to share 50% of their profit with athletes from
revenue-generating sports, after accounting for cost of
scholarships.”240 It also looks to bring in the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) and the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) to work with the Sports Science Institution as well
as the NCAA to address “everything from how to handle concussion
and traumatic brain injuries to sexual assault and interpersonal
violence to athletics health care administration,” 241 all of which are
prominent issues in sports and college generally. Along the lines of
player safety and health, Senator Booker proposed that Congress
should create a medical trust fund paid into by the higher education
institutions to cover any and all “out-of-pocket expenses relating to
any sports-related injury” extending for the five years after a player’s
college athletic career has ended. 242 Even though this proposal is
more limited with respect to NILs, it is the most expansive in every
other area.
C.

Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act

Ohio Congressman Anthony Gonzalez’s plan is born from his
experience as a former Ohio State wide receiver and NFL player.
This plan deviates from the other proposals by calling for the creation
of what is called the “Covered Athletic Organization Commission”
(“Commission”).243 The Commission’s job, among other things,
would be to make recommendations to Congress about NIL rules. 244
The proposal also allows schools to prohibit an athlete from entering
238

College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(A) (2020).
Id. at § 3(a)(3)(B).
240
Id.
241
Senators Booker and Blumenthal Introduce College Athletes Bill of Rights (Dec.
17,
2020),
https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/senators-booker-andblumenthal-introduce-college-athletes-bill-of-rights.
242
College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 6(a)(1)(A-C) (2020).
243
Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 3(a) (2020).
244
Id. at § 3(a)(1).
239
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into endorsement contracts with: “[any] tobacco company or brand,
including any vaping device or e-cigarette or related products, any
alcohol company or brand, any seller or dispensary of a controlled
substance including marijuana, any adult entertainment business, any
casino or entity that sponsor or promote gambling activities.”245 The
committee would also have the power to add any type of company or
brand that it sees fit to the prohibited list.246 Lastly, this proposal
seeks to regulate the recruiting process by prohibiting any booster247
“to directly or indirectly provide or offer to provide any funds or
thing of value as an inducement for a student athlete to enroll or
remain at a specific institution or group of institutions.”248
VII.

FINDING THE MIDDLE GROUND

The state acts and bills discussed above are not nearly as
comprehensive as is needed to address this issue. These statutes are a
start, but do not go far enough. Similar to the state laws and
proposals, the NCAA’s interim bylaw changes simply are not
detailed enough to cover all areas of this complicated issue. Any
such changes that fall short of fully allowing athletes from being
compensated for their NILs will lead to more litigation. The NCAA
has correctly identified that it should not be up to a single court to
overhaul the entirety of a nationwide regulating body. No decision
would be able to anticipate all of the issues that would later arise
from it, due to the fact-intensive nature of governing student-athletes
from across the nation.
Thus, the best solution is a standardized federal act. This act
would theoretically take away any of the recruiting issues that can
arise from the lack of uniformity of state acts and remove the power
245

Id. at § 2(a)(2)(A-E).
Id. at § 3(a)(4).
247
The proposal defines a booster as:
[I]ndividual (other than an individual who is related to a student
athlete) or an organization, including a sponsor of an institution’s
athletic program, that provides substantial financial assistance or
services to the athletic program of an institution of higher
education or that promotes a team or athletic program of an
institution of higher education for such individual’s or
organization’s own substantial financial interest.
Id. at § 5(a)(4).
248
Id. at § 3A.
246
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from the NCAA’s hands which have a clear bias in the outcome.
However, none of the proposed pieces of federal legislation, as they
currently stand, should be the final answer. Rather, a hybrid
approach that combines sections from the various federal proposal
would be a better outcome.
The College Athletes Bill of Rights effectively provides
college athletes with the ability to capitalize on their NILs, while also
allowing the schools to limit their options. 249 This seemingly results
in the best of both worlds. As such, taking from the Student Athlete
Level Playing Field Act, industries such as alcohol, marijuana,
gambling and the like should be prohibited outright. 250 However, the
Act should not go as far as allowing athletes to profit share with the
schools, as this borders on an employee employer relationship.
Moreover, the athletes should be able to organize together to enable
them to enter to enter into group NIL deals and make a profit
collectively in different fields, for example, the lucrative field of
video games.251 Lastly, as provided in the Student Athlete Level
Playing Field Act, boosters should be prohibited and there should be
regulation around incentivizing or attempting to incentivize a recruit
in attending a school. 252 This combined proposal would address the
needs of a college athlete now. It would give them the rights that
they deserve, and the ability to make money that they earn. All the
while, colleges, universities, and the NCAA will be able to retain
some control over the companies that these athletes are eligible to
profit from, thereby limiting any conflicts of interest and respecting
the prestige and name of the NCAA and schools alike.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In 2015, Lebron James, the face of the NBA, signed a lifetime
contract with Nike that “is likely to pay him over $1 billion by the
time he is 64.”253 These same big name apparel companies are

249

College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(A) (2020); see also
id. at § 3(a)(3)(B).
250
Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(A-E)
(2020).
251
Berkowitz, et al., supra note 180.
252
Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 3A (2020).
253
Michael Cannivet, Lebron James' Mega-Deal Shows Why Globalization is Here
to
Stay,
FORBES
(July
17,
2018,
6:41
PM),
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paying large sums to universities to ensure that the athletes who
attend their schools are wearing their gear on game day. 254 Although
college athletes do not have the same “stardom” as a player with the
caliber of Lebron James, there is still a nearly equal amount of money
at play when they lace up. 255
There have been attempts to make changes through the use of
the courts, and while they have shown that the NCAA bylaws are
permeable,256 the outcomes have not been substantial enough.
Regardless, it should not be left up to one court to determine how a
national agency regulates its members..257 States have started to
propose and pass legislation to strike down these archaic NCAA
bylaws in favor of allowing athletes to have the right to profit from
their NILs.258 The state actions, compounded with the Supreme
Court ruling in Alston,259 have forced the hand of the NCAA to adopt
an interim NIL policy. 260 While this is an unprecedented step from
the NCAA, it is imperative that there is federal resolution of this
issue, something that the NCAA is directly calling for. 261 The best
action would be to combine the provisions from three of the leading
proposals. This would give athletes the ability to profit from their
NILs and other lucrative fields such as the video game industry,
while also protecting universities and the NCAA from being
associated with brands or companies that could lead to conflicts of
interest with their current contracts, or those they feel do not best
represent them.
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